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LABOR LAW SYMPOSIUM
THE QUESTION OF "ARBITRABILITY"

-

THE ROLES

OF THE ARBITRATOR, THE COURT, AND
THE PARTIES
by
Russell A. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE UNITED States Supreme Court, in the necessarily uneven
distribution of the wealth of its legal resources, has dealt generously with the labor lawyers of the country. In this field, which
is relatively new, one can think off-hand of a substantial number of
"landmark," if not epochal, decisions, which have had a major
impact in shaping labor relations law. Consider, for example, the
series of decisions which first invited, then curtailed, subjection of
unions to the Sherman Act;' Jones &q Laughlin,' which gave life to
the Wagner Act; Thornhill and its progeny,3 which stirred, then
A.B., Grinnell College; J.D., University of Michigan; Author, Cases & Materials on
Labor (1950-1954); Member, National Academy of Arbitrators; Professor of Law & Associate Dean, University of Michigan. This Article was adapted from a speech delivered to
the Eighth Annual Institute on Labor Law, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas,
November 4, 1961.
' Of special importance were Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945);
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469 (1940); Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); and Lowe v. Lawlor (The "Danbury Hatters'" Case),
208 U.S. 274 (1908). The law review and other literature on this subject is extensive. Of
the more recent contributions, see Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Anti-trust Laws 297 (1955); Chamberlin, The Economic Analysis of Labor
Power (1958); Cheit, Public Policy Toward Trade Unions: Anti-monopoly laws, 9 Lab.
L.J. 705 (1958); and Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104
U. Pa. L. Rev. 252 (1955).
SNLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Companion cases were
Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S.
58 (1937); and NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937). For some of the
many general discussions of these cases, see Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining,
ch. 16 (1940); Geffs & Hepburn, The Wagner Act Cases, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1937);
Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1089 (1937); and Nathanson, Wagner Act Decisions Studied
in Retrospect, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 196 (1937).
'Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), was the starting point. It was followed
by a succession of decisions of which the following are probably the most significant:

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.

16

dissipated, the hopes of trade unionists for a solid constitutional basis
for picketing; the "pre-emption" cases,' marking out the boundaries
of federal-state action; the Youngstown' and Steelworkers' cases,
showing the limit and breadth of national "emergency" dispute
powers; the Chicago River' case, which vitalized the grievance
settlement processes provided by the Railway Labor Act; and
Lincoln Mills," which laid the foundation for a federal law concerning the labor agreement. The Court's June 1960 trilogy of
Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Building Service Employees Int'l
Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950);
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490 (1949); Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942);
AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); and Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). The legal comment on these decisions has been prolific. Of the first "wave," see Gregory, Labor and the Law, ch. XII (rev. ed. 1949); Dodd,
Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1943); Gregory, Peaceful
Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 26 A.B.A.J. 709 (1940); Teller, Picketing and Free
Speech, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180 (1942); and Teller, Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply,
56 Harv. L. Rev. 532 (1943). Of the later reviews of the problem, see Gregory,
Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Unions and Employer Conduct, 49
Mich. L. Rev. 191 (1950); Jones, Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas!, Amidst
Confusion, Consistent Principle, 29 So. Cal. L. Rev. 137 (1956); Samoff, Picketing and the
First Amendment: 'Full Circle' and 'Formal Surrender,' 9 Lab L.J. 889 (1958); and Smith,
The Supreme Court and Labor, 1950-1953, 8 Sw. L.J. 1, 9-11 (1954).
' Of the more important may be cited San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S.
617 (1958); Guss v. Utah LRB, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348
U.S. 468 (1955); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Street, Electric Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees of America v. Wisconsin ERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951); UAW-CIO v.
O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); UAW-AFL v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U.S. 245 (1949);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State LRB, 330 U.S. 767 (1947); and Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538 (1945). Again, the commentary on this line of decisions has been most
prolific. For early analyses, see Cox & Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv.
L. Rev. 211 (1950); Feinsinger, Federal-State Relations Under the Taft-Hartley Act,
Proceedings, N.Y.U. 1st Annual Conference on Labor 463 (1948); Petro, Federal-State
Relations in Labor Law, I Lab. L.J. 419 (1950); and Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and
State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 593 (1948). For later treatments,
see Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1297 (1954); Hays,
Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959 (1954); and
Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59
Colum. L. Rev. 6 (1959).
'Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally
Freund, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 89 (1952); Kauper, The Steel
Seizure Case, Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 141 (1952);
and Petro, The Supreme Court and the Steel Seizure, 3 Lab. L.J. 451 (1952).
' United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
"Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River Ry., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
'Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See generally Aaron,
On First Looking Into the Lincoln Mills Decision, in Arbitration and the Law, 12th Annual Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators 1 (1959); Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and
the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1957); Bunn, Lincoln
Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 Va. L. Rev.
1247 (1957); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1959);
Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 Va.
L. Rev. 1261 (1957); and Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 Mich. L. Rev.
635 (1959).
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decisions in Warrior &qGulf and companion cases,' which provide
the background for this Article, must be counted an important
addition to this group.
In a talk before the Cleveland Bar Association in March 1961,
I strove, as others have done before and since,"0 to assess these cases.
I attempted to report on how judges had been reacting to the decisions as they continued to confront issues of "arbitrability." I
also suggested that the impact of the decisions might be "more
noticeable in the areas of collective bargaining and contract administration, including arbitration, than in the arena of the courts,"
but, lacking any concrete evidence to present on this matter, I
indulged in the familiar process of speculation.
In this Article I would like to continue this effort for the
following three reasons. First, there is now somewhat more "evidence"
to report than was available in March; second, my opinion remains
unchanged that the "big three" decisions "are extremely significant";
third, they offer an excellent, if not unique, opportunity to explore
and test the policy assumptions and the practical consequences of
legal doctrine.

II.

THE PROBLEM

It is unnecessary to review more than briefly the central issue posed
in the 1960 cases. The problem was how to delineate the roles of
the court and the arbitrator with respect to the issue of "arbitrability." The problem arises out of the fact that in this country the
arbitration of labor disputes rests on the consent of the parties,
except in the case of railroads and airlines subject to the Railway
Labor Act, who are bound to use the statutory "adjustment board"
procedures, or some mutually acceptable substitute, to settle grievances. We do not have, as in Europe, a system of "labor courts"
with broad jurisdiction over labor disputes arising out of the application of labor agreements. Here, in industry generally, labor management need not agree to submit such disputes to arbitration, although
it is national policy to encourage them to do so. Where there is an
agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrator's authority derives from the
" United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); and United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
1See, among other discussions, Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: An
Arbitrator's View, 63 W. Va. L. Rev. 295 (1961); Gould, The Supreme Court and Labor
Arbitration, 12 Lab. L.J. 331 (1961); Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law, 60 Colum.
L. Rev. 454 (1961); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability, and Collective Bargaining,
28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 464 (1961); Snyder, What Has the Supreme Court Done to Arbitration?,
12 Lab. L.J. 93 (1961); and Wallen, Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Arbitration:
An Arbitrator's View, 63 W. Va. L. Rev. 295 (1961).
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agreement, and his jurisdiction is therefore limited to those matters
which the parties by their agreement have entrusted to him for
decision.
This means, according to traditional analysis, that the arbitrator
cannot, except by special stipulation, be the final judge either of
the existence of a contractually binding agreement to arbitrate, or
of the scope of his authority under such an agreement. Under our
law, these issues may be finally determined only by courts of competent jurisdiction, since only these tribunals are empowered to enforce
agreements. It follows that if the arbitration agreement gives the
arbitrator jurisdiction to decide issue A but not issue B, and does
not give him authority to decide his own jurisdiction, but he nevertheless assumes authority to decide issue B, his award in this respect
is ultra vires and will not be enforced by a court.
These simple and clear-cut propositions are easy to formulate and
unquestionably sound in legal theory. Where a valid agreement
to arbitrate carefully defines the issue or issues to be decided in the
specific case (as under a carefully drawn submission agreement),
there is usually no occasion for a problem of "arbitrability" to
arise. Typically, however, the grievance arbitration process rests on
the provision in the collective bargaining agreement which makes
arbitration the terminal point of the grievance procedure. Typically,
also, the arbitration clause contains broad "jurisdictional" language,
e.g., authority in the arbitrator to decide "disputes arising out of
the interpretation and application of this agreement" (meaning the
collective bargaining agreement). While many arbitration clauses
contain exceptions and limitations, the clause must, nevertheless, of
necessity be broad in scope as compared with a narrow and specific
submission agreement.
This fact makes it possible for a party opposing arbitration of a
particular dispute (normally the employer) to contend that the
dispute is not arbitrable if the labor agreement, properly construed,
contains no applicable commitment by that party on the basis of
which the moving party's claim could be sustained. In numerous
instances, courts, accepting this analysis, have either stopped arbitration ad limine or have set aside arbitration awards. However, inevitably, this kind of disposition has required them to interpret
some provision or provisions of the labor agreement and has thus
involved the judiciary in the "merits" of the underlying dispute.
Yet, it is the arbitrator's interpretation of the provisions of the
agreement for which the parties supposedly bargained when they
agreed upon the arbitration process.
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This was the kind of problem which was posed in Warrior &
Gulf and companion cases, and in many prior state and lower federal
court decisions.11 The problem was to give proper scope to the
arbitration process and yet to take account of the fact that ultimately,
in the absence of agreement otherwise, the question of arbitrability
of a specific issue is for the courts. Some writers accused the courts
of improper and even capricious interference with the arbitration
process.1" Whether, on the whole, these charges were warranted, prior
to Warrior & Gulf, is a debatable issue. It is my impression that
intervention by the courts occurred principally when the claim
made by the party seeking arbitration had to rest on an express
provision of the labor agreement which, on its face, did not appear
to support the claim, or on an obligation said to be implicit, even
though not expressed, in the agreement. Illustrative of the former
was the famous Cutler-Hammer decision 3 by the New York courts,
in which it was held that an express contractual commitment by
the employer to meet and discuss with the Union "the payment of
a bonus" could not support a grievance, following such discussion,
based on the employer's refusal to pay a bonus. Illustrative of the
latter were the cases in which the courts held against the arbitrability of the employer's contracting out of work of a kind which
would be performed by bargaining unit employees, where the agreement contained no specific provision on this subject.
Perhaps the most usual, and certainly the most plausible, judicial
approach in denying arbitrability was to say, as did the New York
Court of Appeals in Cutler-Hammer, that the contract was "so
clear . . . and so untenable any other interpretation that we are
obliged to hold that there is no dispute as to the meaning of the ...
provision and no contract to arbitrate the issue tendered." Judge
Fulk dissented on the ground that "reasonable men" could differ
concerning the interpretation of the bonus provision, but he also
conceded that a "claim may be 'so unconscionable or a defense so

frivolous' as to justify the court in refusing to order the parties to
proceed to arbitration," which is perhaps simply another way of
stating the principle subscribed to in the majority opinion. Un" See the reviews of these cases in Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, ch. 2
(rev. ed. 1960); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration in the Light of the Lincoln
Mills Case, in Arbitration and the Law, 12th Annual Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators 24
(1959); Mayer, Judicial 'Bulls' in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration, 2 Lab.
L.J. 502 (1951); Scoles, Review of Labor Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional Grounds,
17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 616 (1950); and Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, or
Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1952).
"See some of the comment cited supra note 10.
'3IAM v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, aff'd, 297 N.Y.
519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
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fortunately, but understandably, what is not clear or non-frivolous
to one judge may be clear and frivolous to another. The opportunity
this and other more interventionist approaches present for judicial
interference with the arbitration process is the only thing about
this subject which is clear and non-frivolous.
This general problem of the role of the judiciary in relation to
the arbitration process was destined to reach the Supreme Court
in view of the decision in Lincoln Mills. The Court there held that
an agreement to arbitrate labor disputes arising out of a labor
agreement is specifically enforceable as a matter of federal right
under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, notwithstanding state
common law to the contrary. A federal substantive law concerning
the labor agreement was to be developed by the courts in the exercise of their resources of "judicial inventiveness." The 1960 decisions
brought the issue of "arbitrability" into sharp focus, as a federal
question, and presumably we now have the answer.
III.

WARRIOR

&

GULF AND ITS COMPANION CASES

Warrior &qGulf" was a "contracting out" case. The grievances,
brought by the United Steelworkers, protested the contracting out
of certain maintenance work of a kind clearly encompassed within
the definition of the bargaining unit. There was a layoff situation
at the time the grievances were filed, and, in part, this was due to
the contracting out of the work in question. The labor agreement
was silent on the subject of contracting out; however, it may be
assumed that it contained "recognition," wage, and seniority provisions. The labor agreement also contained a "no strike" provision.
The arbitration clause excepted matters which are "strictly a function
of management," but otherwise was unusually broad. It stated:
Should differences arise between the Company and the Union or its
members . .. as to the meaning and application of the provisions of

this Agreement, or should any local trouble of any kind arise, there
shall be no suspension of work on account of such differences, but an
earnest effort shall be made to settle such differences in the following
manner [referring to the grievance and arbitration procedure].

In a suit by the Union under Section 301 to compel arbitration, the
district court granted the Company's motion to dismiss, holding that
the agreement did not "confide in an arbitrator the right to review
the defendant's business judgment in contracting out work" and
that contracting out was "strictly a function of management" within
the meaning of the exclusionary language of the arbitration clause.
4 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574

(1960).
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The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Thus,
the Company was forced to arbitrate and that arbitration has now
been completed.15 The arbitrator was asked to decide, first, whether
the issue of his own jurisdiction and authority was before him despite
the Supreme Court's decision. He evidently concluded that he still
had the issue, for he considered it and held that the Union's claim
presented an arbitrable question under the contract. On the merits,
he partially sustained the union, although the opinion amply illustrates the difficulty of determining precisely what kinds of limitations on sub-contracting may be implied. "
'5C.C.H. Lab. Arb. Awards, 61-2, 5 8401 (1961).
1 The arbitrator, J. Fred Holly, upon an extensive review of the "1952 bargaining history" on the subject, between the parties, concluded that the parties "jointly recognize a
limitation on contracting out," and considered that he found support for this in the testimony of Company witnesses and in the Company brief as indicating the following possible
limitations:
1. Where the contracting out is in bad faith.
2. Where the purpose of contracting out is to subvert the Union.
3. When it is costlier and less convenient to have the work done elsewhere.
4. When the contracting out is less efficient.
5. When Company employees and facilities are presently available to do
the work.
He added that, according to the Union's view, there are other situations in which contracting out is clearly improper, and, on the other hand, "that there are eleven types of
subcontracting that are proper." "These conclusions," said the Arbitrator, "place the
Arbitrator in an unusually difficult position." He stated that, "in order to properly evaluate
the practice of subcontracting, it is necessary to analyze specific contracts or instances of
contracting out," but that, since the grievance before him was "general," and the testimony
was "general," he found such a review of specific instances "difficult and largely impossible."
He appeared, however, to place the burden upon the Company of justifying any challenged
instance of contracting out, and this, he said, the Company had failed to do. "This situation
demands an explanation of the failure of the Company to replace employees in what had
been described as a 'normal' size workforce and at the same time to increase the dollar
volume of work contracted out. In the absence of proof that work was properly contracted out, the Arbitrator can only conclude that at least one type of improper contracting out occurred between the dates of the protested layoffs and the filing of the
grievance."
"Having reached this conclusion," said the Arbitrator, "what relief is available?" The
Union sought (1) a restoration of seniority rights for laid-off employees, (2) pay for those
laid-off employees who were deprived of the right to do work contracted out since the
filing of the grievance, and (3) pay for such laid-off employees, " 'as if they had done the
work for all jobs (if any) contracted to other firms for any reason not specifically approved
in Section VI'" of the Union's brief. He held (1) that his jurisdiction did not extend
to events subsequent to the filing of the grievance, and that, accordingly, he was "not
empowered to grant relief on subsequent events," (2) that he "does not possess the authority
to order the parties to accept his criteria for contracting out and to require them to
examine all past instances of contracting out in the light of these standards," since "to do
this, the Arbitrator would be guilty of legislating where the parties have not legislated,"
but (3) that there were "firm grounds for advancing the seniority of those employees who
were laid off in December 1956 and January 1957." His award advanced "the layoff dates"
of those employees who were laid off in December 1956 and January 1957 to August 22,
1958, the date of the grievance, since, in his view, "some" contracting out was improper
between December 1956 and the date of the grievance, and "it naturally follows that some
employees were entitled to recall and this would have provided seniority rights for at least
two additional years."
His concluding paragraph shows his evident feeling of frustration:
Finally, the Arbitrator is well aware of the fact that this holding does
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In American Mfg."7 the question was whether the Company was
required to submit to arbitration a grievance based on its refusal to
reinstate an employee who had suffered an industrial injury. In a
consent decree settlement of a workmen's compensation claim, the
employee had been awarded a lump sum payment plus costs on the
basis that he had incurred a permanent partial disability of twentyfive per cent. The employee's subsequent demand for reinstatement
was predicated on a statement by his physician (who had supported
the earlier claim of permanent partial disability) that the employee
"is now able to return to his former duties without danger to himself or to others." Contractually, the demand was based on a provision in the seniority article of the labor agreement which recognized
"tthe principle of seniority as a factor in the selection of employees
for promotion, transfer, layoff, re-employment, and filling of vacancies, where ability and efficiency are equal." The arbitration clause was
"standard," in that it permitted arbitration of "any disputes, misunderstandings, differences or grievances arising between the parties
as to the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions
of this agreement." The district court and court of appeals refused
to require the Company to arbitrate, although disagreeing on the
basis of decision. The district court used an estoppel theory. The
court of appeals held that this did not go to the question of arbitrability, but it examined the cited seniority provision and concluded
that the grievance was "a frivolous, patently baseless one" and hence
not within the arbitration clause. Again, the Supreme Court disagreed and ordered arbitration. At the completion of the arbitration
proceedings, the arbitrator apparently awarded the employee's reinstatement, but without back pay!
In the Enterprise case," the grievance sought the reinstatement
of certain employees who had been discharged because they left
their jobs in protest against the discharge of a fellow-employee. The
Company refused to arbitrate the grievance, but was ordered to do
so by a federal district court. The arbitrator's decision reduced the
penalty of discharge to ten days' disciplinary layoff, and ordered
the grievants' reinstatement with back pay adjusted for the tenday penalty. The decision was handed down five days after the
not settle the problem of contracting out. He is convinced, however, that in
view of the nature of the grievance and the evidence he is powerless to do
more. Now that the conclusion has been reached that implied limitations exist
on the right of the Company to contract out work, the parties can proceed to
resolve the problem to their own interests and satisfaction.
" United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
" United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
(1960).

593
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parties' collective agreement had expired. The Company refused to
comply with the award on the ground, inter alia, that the arbitrator
lacked the authority to make an order for back pay for any period
subsequent to the expiration date of the labor agreement, or for
reinstatement. The district court directed the Company to comply
with the award. The court of appeals reversed, on the ground urged
by the Company. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the authority
of the arbitrator.
The decisions in these cases, as distinguished from the majority
opinions by Mr. Justice Douglas, were concurred in by seven justices.
Mr. Justice Whittaker dissented and Mr. Justice Black did not participate. In view of the nature of the grievances involved in these
cases, and the ultimate decision on the questions of arbitrability or
authority, it is apparent that the cases indicate a strong federal policy
favoring liberal interpretation of arbitration clauses on the issue
of the arbitrator's jurisdiction and a highly restricted role for the
courts.1 9
" I have no difficulty with the decisions in Warrior &1Gulf and in American Mfg., since
I think they were right even if Cutler-Hammer and associated approaches were taken as the
proper standards for judicial determination of the question of whether arbitration should
be ordered with respect to a particular claim. The arbitration clause in Warrior d Gulf was
extremely broad, but, even if it had been of the "standard" variety, the claim that the
agreement gave rise to an implied limitation on the right to contract out was not "patently
frivolous" or "clearly untenable." The same is true of a claim for reinstatement insofar as
based on the broad seniority clause contained in the American Manufacturing agreement.
Even a decision, as in Enterprise, that the arbitrator has jurisdiction to order reinstatement
of an employee after the expiration of the underlying labor agreement is not patently wrong
if the agreement did not expressly prohibit such an order. The prime difficulty with Enterprise is that we don't know that this was the basis of the arbitrator's decision.
The extremely broad scope of the decisions is best revealed, indeed, by the result in
Enterprise, for, of the three, this is the case in which the conclusion concerning the arbitrator's authority was the most dubious. The issue here was not the "arbitrability" of the
grievances as originally filed, while the labor agreement was in effect. Clearly, they were
arbitrable. The question was whether the arbitrator had authority to grant a remedy
of back pay and reinstatement effective beyond the expiration date of the agreement. The
arbitrator's opinion apparently did not indicate clearly whether his asserted authority was
based on what the Court refers to as "the requirements of enacted legislation" or on a construction of the agreement, itself. However, said the Court, "a mere ambiguity . . . is
not a reason for refusing to enforce the award." The Court apparently would have held that
the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction if his award had been predicated on "the law"
rather than on the agreement. But the Court said that since the award might have been
based on the arbitrator's reading of the agreement, it had to be upheld, because "it is the
arbitrator's construction which was bargained for." Thus, the award was deemed to be
within the arbitrator's jurisdiction even though, in fact, he may not have based it on his
construction of the agreement, and even though the Court did not have before it evidence
of that very interpretative process for which the parties, supposedly, bargained. This is going
pretty far! I take it the case means that an award rendered without any supporting opinion
at all must be upheld if it could have been based on an interpretation of the agreement,
except only if the agreement, or some other clear and persuasive evidence, revealed clearly
his lack of authority in the premises.
Beyond this, it is quite clear, as noted infra, that the Court intended to repudiate
Cutler-Hammer and associated approaches to the question of judicial determination of
arbitrability, and to prescribe, as a matter of federal law, a much more restrictive role for
the courts.
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I find in the decisions (read with the opinions) certain propositions, express or implied.
The first proposition is that the question of arbitrabilityof a specific
claim under a valid general agreement to arbitrate is still, ultimately,
a question for the courts unless the parties have expressly given the
arbitratorjurisdiction to make a binding determination of this question.
This is made clear in a footnote to the majority opinion in Warrior
&. Gulf."° The proposition is also clearly stated in the concurring
opinion of Justices Brennan and Harlan. 1 The important point about
this is that, despite the Court's general disposition toward broad
arbitral jurisdiction, it is unwilling to read the "standard" type of
arbitration clause as intended to confer upon the arbitrator the
authority to decide with finality his own jurisdiction. The decision
on this point could have been otherwise, of course, since the arbitration clause is itself a part of the labor agreement, and it could be
said that since the arbitrator has jurisdiction of disputes concerning
the interpretation and application of the agreement, he can determine finally whether the particular claim or grievance involves such
a dispute. This kind of "bootstraps" approach, however, was more
than the Court was willing to swallow. I consider sound this interpretation of the standard arbitration clause, since I doubt that the
parties expect through such a clause to invest the arbitrator with
this kind of final authority.
The second proposition is that, although the ultimate question of
arbitrabilityis for the court, the court should abjure a decision against
arbitrabilityof a dispute whenever the moving party claims, although
in vague and general terms, a violation of the labor agreement, unless
the labor agreement clearly, expressly, and specifically gives the adverse
party the right to perform the act complained of, or unless there is
forceful and clear evidence, either within or apart from the labor agreement, that the parties intended to exclude the issue from the arbitration
process.
This is an interpretation both of the results in the three cases and
20Footnote 7 reads:
It is clear under both the agreement in this case and that involved
in American Mfg. Co., 362 U.S. 564, 80 S. Ct. 1343, the question of arbitrability is for the courts to decide. Cf. Cox, Reflections Ubon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1508-09. Where the assertion by the claimant
is that the parties excluded from court determination not merely the decision
of the merits of the grievance but also the question of its arbitrability, vesting
power to make both decisions in the arbitrator, the claimant must bear the
burden of a clear demonstration of that purpose.
21 "To be sure, since arbitration is a creature of contract, a court must always inquire,
when a party seeks to invoke its aid to force a reluctant party to the arbitration table,
whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute. In this sense, the
question of whether a dispute is 'arbitrable' is inescapably for the court."
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of certain expressions in the majority and concurring opinions. I
rely primarily on what is said in the majority opinion in American
Mfg., and particularly, on the following:"
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merit of the
grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim,
or determining whether there is a particular language in the written
instrument which will support the claim. The agreement is to submit
all grievances to arbitration, not merely those the court will deem
meritorious. The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of the plant environment
may be quite unaware.
The Union claimed in this case that the company had violated a
specific provision of the contract. The company took the position that
it had not violated that clause. There was, therefore, a dispute between
the parties as to 'the meaning, interpretation and application' of the
collective-bargaining agreement. Arbitration should have been ordered.
I also rely upon the following observations made in the opinion in
Warrior & Gulf:23
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
A specific collective-bargaining agreement may exclude contractingout from the grievance procedure. Or a written collateral agreement
may make clear that contracting out was not a matter for arbitration.
In such a case, a grievance based solely on contracting-out would not
be arbitrable .... In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful
evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague and the
arbitration clause quite broad.
This second proposition is the crux of the decisions, for it is this
ruling, if correctly stated, which represents the Court's new contribution to arbitration law. The Cutler-Hammer and associated
judicial approaches are formally rejected. Consequently, a claim of
violation of the labor agreement which is arguably so lacking in
363 U.S. at 568-69.
588. It should be noted, further, that the court relied, at least to
some extent, upon the broad no-strike clause contained in the contract. The Opinion
states (at 583):
A collective bargaining agreement may treat only with certain specific
practices, leaving the rest to management but subject to the possibility
of work stoppages. When, however, an absolute no-strike clause is included
in the agreement, then in a very real sense everything that management does
is subject to the agreement, for either management is prohibited or limited in
the action it takes, or if not, it is protected from interference by strikes. . ..
22

3 363 U.S. at 582,

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

merit as to be patently frivolous or untenable is to be ordered to
arbitration, and, if arbitrated and upheld, is not to be reversed,
unless there is clear and specific evidence that the parties did not
intend that such a claim should be arbitrated. It appears that the
practical effect of this principle is to give the arbitrator jurisdiction
to decide with finality the issue of arbitrability, as well as the merits
of the underlying claim, in most cases. The courts remain available
to a party contesting the arbitrator's jurisdiction, but doubts about
the scope of the arbitration clause are to be resolved in favor of the
arbitration process. To justify judicial intervention, the intention
of the parties to exclude a matter from this process must be expressed in clear and unambiguous language in the labor agreement,
the arbitration submission (if there is one), a collateral agreement,
or conceivably, in overwhelmingly convincing parol evidence.
The third proposition is that the labor agreement is sui generis, and
has at least these characteristics:
1. "It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a
myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate" (from
the opinion in Warrior &q Gulf, citing Shulman, "Reason, Contract and
Law in Labor Relations." 2 4 ).
2. "It calls into being a new common law-the common law of a
particular industry or of a particular plant" (again from the opinion

in Warrior C Gulf).
3. It is "an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government,"
and thus has "institutional characteristics" (from the same opinion,
this time citing Cox, "Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration," 25).

These characteristics move Mr. Justice Douglas in Warrior & Gulf
to some flights of unfeigned enthusiasm in describing the arbitration process and the role of the arbitrator: "Arbitration is the means
of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for
all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solution
in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and
desires of the parties." The following language from the opinion

shows how respectful he is of arbitrators and their task:
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to
the Courts; the considerations which help him fashion judgments may
indeed be foreign to the competence of Courts. The labor arbitrator's
source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the industry and
the shop--is equally a part of the collective-bargaining agreement
24 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999 (1955).

2572 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1959).
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although not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment. The
parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect
not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective-bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of
a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his
judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the
parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily to further
their common goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement,
to make the agreement serve their specialized needs. The ablest judge
cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to
bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be
similarly informed.2"
One may wonder why the Justice elected to essay these ventures
into industrial jurisprudence and philosophy. Certainly, he need not
have done so simply to support the results reached in these cases. Did
he consider that the lower court judges are more likely to heed the
lesson of the decisions if their supposed state of unenlightenment in
the area of labor relations is met head-on by a dissertation designed
to improve their understanding? Did the Justice intend to lay down
as a matter of federal substantive law some definite principles concerning the nature of the agreement, the interpretation of certain
kinds of provisions of the agreement, and the role of the arbitrator
in implementing the agreement? Are arbitrators, indeed, now required, or at least invited, in adjudicating a grievance, to take account of "such factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular
result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment
whether tensions will be heightened or diminished?"
I have mixed reactions about these expressions in the Justice's
opinions. I certainly agree that the labor agreement is not just an
ordinary contract, and, therefore, the emphasis upon this point and
upon the "industrial self government" characteristics of the agreement is sound. But I am a little distressed with many of the sweeping generalizations of the opinion. I am afraid some theoreticians
of industrial relations may take them as gospel, and teach their students that the labor agreement and the arbitration function are
everything the Justice says they are. The fact is, this may not be so,
at least in many contexts, or even generally. Both remain the product
of bargaining, and it seems dubious that the Court did intend to
rule that parties are incompetent to make of them what they will.
Undeniably, however, the thrust of the opinions is to give the labor
agreement and the arbitration process a status in law somewhat
detached from its putative contractual base. This is probably a good
28 363

U.S.

at 581-82.
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jurisprudential development; however, we need to be careful in its
delineation lest real damage be done to the collective bargaining
relationship.
IV.

IMPACT OF THE

1960

DECISIONS ON THE JUDICIARY

A brief examination of the impact of the 1960 decisions on the

judiciary is pertinent, since the "proof of the pudding," in the case
of appellate decisions, is in their "eating" below. I have checked
most of the cases in which the question of arbitrability has been
raised since the decisions were handed down. Most courts have apparently taken them to heart and have felt constrained, although
in some instances grudgingly and with serious misgivings, to permit
or require arbitration to proceed without judicial intervention, and
have upheld awards despite challenges going to the jurisdiction of
the arbitrator." Without extending this Article unduly, I cannot
" Textile Workers Union v. Cone Mills Corp., 290 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1961); Henderson v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 290 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1961); International Tel. &
Tel. Corp. v. IUEW, 290 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1961); Local 95, Office Employees Int'l
Union v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 287 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1961); Drake Bakeries, Inc.
v. Bakery Workers Union, 287 F.2d 155, withdrawn on rehearing, 294 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.
1961); Operating Engineers Union v. Crooks Bros. Tractor Co., 43 C.C.H. Lab Cas.
5 17169 (9th Cir. 1961); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. IUEW, 43 C.C.H. Lab Cas.
5 17149 (5th Cir. 1961); IAM v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 43 C.C.H. Lab Cas.
17031 (5th Cir. 1961); R.C.A. v. Association of Professional Eng'ring Personnel, 42
C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 16968 (3d Cir. 1961); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Local 400,
Professional Division, IUEW, 286 F.2d 329 (3d Cir 1960); Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 283 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1960); International
Molders & Foundry Workers v. Susquehanna Casting Co., 283 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1960);
UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 193 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Chemical Workers
Union v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17181 (S.D. Tex. 1961);
Wright v. Ford Motor Co., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17163 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Retail,
Wholesale & Dept. Store Union v. Vaughn's Sanitary Bakery, Inc., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
5 17160 (N.D. Pa. 1961); Hammond Newspaper Guild v. Hammond Publishing Co.,
43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17159 (N.D. Ind. 1961); Garment Workers Union v. Beauty Bilt
Lingerie, Inc., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17126 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Hilton v. Norfolk & W.
Ry., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17053 (S.D.W. Va. 1961); United Steelworkers of America
v. Zweig & Sons, 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 16934 (N.D. Ind. 1961); Building Service
Employees Union v. Polk Bros., 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 16797 (N.D. Ill. 1961); Howard
v. U.S. Rubber Co., 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 16775 (D. Mass. 1961); District Lodge 1,
IAM v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 16763 (E.D. Pa. 1961); UAW
v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 188 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ohio 1960);
Maryland Tel. Union v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 187 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1960);
Local 410, Retail Shoe & Textile Salesman's Union v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 185 F.
Supp. 558 (N.D. Cal. 1960); UAW v. Waltham Screw Co., 42 C.C.H. Lab Cas. 5
16769 (D. Mass. 1960); Retail Dep't Store Employees Union v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
41 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 16738 (W.D. Wash. 1960); Hales Bros. Stores v. Retail Clerks
Union, 361 P.2d 705 (Cal. 1961); Grunwald-Marx Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Board of
Clothing Workers, 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 50297 (Cal. App. 1961); Oil Workers Union
v. Texaco, Inc., 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17008 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1961); United States Pipe
& Foundry Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 170 A.2d 505 (N.J. Super. 1961);
Fownes Bros. & Co. v. Clothing Workers Union, 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
17133 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1961); In re Murphy, 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
50291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961);
Morton Karten, Inc. v. Garment Workers Union, 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 50268 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1961); Gold v. Teicher & Sons, Inc., 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 50214 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
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dissect these decisions in an attempt to determine to what extent
these same courts might have reached like results without benefit

of the Supreme Court's pronouncements, but at least I can say that
in most instances, the Court's decisions were cited as if they were
influential. However, in a substantial number of cases arbitral
jurisdiction has been denied, in some instances improperly, in my
judgment, if proper account had been taken of the 1960 decisions. 8
The cases cover a wide range of issues in which arbitration was

sought, many of which are sufficiently intriguing to be worthy
of discussion on their merits. They include the following: The right
of the employer to subcontract, absent a specifically restrictive contract provision;"' the authority of an arbitrator under a "just cause"
or other contract provision to modify a disciplinary penalty;" the
right of the employer to "retire" an employee where the employer's
retirement policy is not part of the collective agreement;" the right
of an employee to litigate instead of arbitrate his claim of breach of
the collective agreement where the grievance and arbitration procedure are available;" the effect of a failure to file a grievance within
1961); National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson, 171 N.E.2d 302 (N.Y. 1960); Volunteer
Elec. Co-op. v. Gann, 41 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
16537 (Tenn. App. 1960).
"8Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961); Vulcan-Cincinnati,
Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, 289 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1961); Textile Workers
Union v. American Thread Co., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17030 (4th Cir. 1961); IUEW
v. Magnovox Co., 286 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1960), rehearing denied, 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
5 16778 (1961); Portland Web Pressman's Union v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 286 F.2d
4 (9th Cir. 1960); IUEW v. General Elec. Co., 283 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1960); Central
Packing Co. v. Packinghouse Workers Union, 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17068 (D.C. Kan.
1961); Proctor & Gamble Independent Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 43 C.C.H.
Lab. Cas. 5 17050 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Operating Engineers Union v. Standard Oil Co.,
186 F. Supp. 895 (D.N.D. 1960); Byars v. National Dairy Food Prod. Corp., 42 C.C.H.
Lab Cas. 5 16858 (Ala. 1961); Connecticut Union of Telephone Workers, Inc. v. Southern
New England Tel. Co., 169 A.2d 646 (Conn. 1961); Mueller Co. v. Baking & Confectionary Workers Union, 170 A.2d 514 (N.J. Super. 1961); Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. v.
United Steelworkers of America, 173 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio App. 1960).
"International Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Local 400, IUEW, 286 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1960);
UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 193 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Operating Engineers
Union v. Standard Oil Co., 186 F. Supp. 895 (D.N.D. 1960); Morton Karten, Inc. v.
50268 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
Garment Workers Union, 42 C.C.H. Lab Cas.
"Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17030 (4th
Cir. 1961)
(holding arbitrator exceeded his authority). Contra, Oil Workers Union
v. Texaco, Inc., 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17008 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1961). For a recent
arbitration case in which this issue was bitterly contested, see Todd Shipyards Corp. &
IAM, C.C.H. Lab. Arb. Awards 61-2 5 8475 (1961).
"International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. IUEW, 290 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1961); Chemical
17181 (S.D. Tex.
Workers Union v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
1961); and Hales Bros. Stores v. Retail Clerks Union, 361 P.2d 705 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1961).
In each instance the issue was held to be artitrable.
"2Henderson v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 290 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1961); Hilton v.
17053 (S.D.W. Va. 1961); Gold v. Teicher
Norfolk & W. Ry., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
& Sons, Inc., 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 50214 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961). In each instance it was
held that the employee could not elect to litigate instead of arbitrate.
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applicable time limitations;"a the finality of managerial determination of a job evaluation question; 4 and the availability of arbitration
in lieu of litigation against a union which has breached a no-strike
provision."
In most instances, the question arose on a petition to require or
stay arbitration. In some, however, the question was whether an
arbitration award was valid and enforceable. There seems to be no
apparent differentiation between the courts' approaches to these two
types of cases, although some distinction might well be justified. In
some instances, the courts sustained the arbitrability of claims based
on generalized assertions that the employer had violated its obligations, express or implied, under the labor agreement." In others, the
court was confronted with specific provisions excluding certain
areas from arbitral jurisdiction, and, perforce, had to interpret these
provisions or else leave them to the arbitrator for interpretation.3
The "subcontracting" cases present a problem of special interest.
Some sharply contrasting views are represented by the cases decided
since Warrior & Gulf. In InternationalTel. d4 Tel. Co. v. Local 400,
33 Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, 173 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio
App. 1960). It was held that the failure to file a grievance within the stated time limits
released the employer from any obligation to arbitrate. But cf. United Steelworkers of
16934 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
America v, Zweig & Sons, 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
14 Connecticut Union of Telephone Workers, Inc. v. Southern New England Tel. Co.,
148 Conn. 192, 169 A.2d 646 (1961). The contract contained a definite procedure for
job evaluation and provided that the decision at the last stage of such procedure was final.
The contract also included provision for arbitration of "any dispute or controversy concerning the true intent and meaning of a provision of this Contract, or a question as to
the performance of any obligation hereunder." The Court, citing Warrior F1 Gulf, held
that the determination of the arbitrability of a particular dispute is a function of the
court, and that in this instance the dispute lay outside the area of arbitrability.
" Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961); Vulcan-Cincinnati,
Inc. v. United States Steelworkers of America, 289 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1961); Drake
Bakeries, Inc. v. American Bakery Workers Union, 287 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1961), opinion
17166 (1961).
withdrawn after rehearing in Drake, 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
"s See, for example, the "subcontracting" cases, supra note 29; also Proctor & Gamble
17050 (E.D.N.Y.
Independent Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 43 C.C.H. Lab Cas.
1961).
"7IUEW v. General Elec. Co., 283 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1960) (holding non-arbitrable
a grievance which relied upon an alleged "local understanding," where the contract specified
that any such local understanding had to be in writing and signed by the parties in order
to be the basis of an arbitration proceeding); Hammond Newspaper Guild v. Hammond
Publishing Co., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17159 (N.D. Ind. 1961)-holding that a
grievance protesting the performance of "unit" work by executives was arbitrable, since
an exclusionary provision in the arbitration clause had to be interpreted; R.C.A. v. Association
of Professional Eng'ring Personnel, 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 16968 (3d Cir. 1961)holding that a grievance involving merit increases was arbitrable even though the agreement contained a provision which denied the arbitrator any authority to change an
existing wage rate or to establish a new rate (this provision, said the Court, "is not clear");
Local 95, Office Employees Union v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 287 F.2d 452 (7th Cir.
1961)-holding that the question whether grievant had sufficient skill and seniority for
a job was arbitrable even though certain provisions in the contract appeared to vest
complete discretion in the employer to determine all questions of job qualifications.
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IUEW, s the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarily and
quite properly ruled that a grievance protesting the contracting-out
of work was arbitrable under a "standard" type of arbitration clause,
since there was no specific exclusion of the matter from arbitration,
and there was no claim of the existence of any collateral background showing that subcontracting was an unchallengeable managerial prerogative. In Local 725, Operating Engineers Union v.
Standard Oil Co."s a federal district court in North Dakota concluded that subcontracting was not arbitrable on the grounds (1)
that the arbitration clause in question was not as broad as that in
Warrior & Gulf, and (2) that the limitations imposed by the contract on the arbitration process were much less vague and indefinite
than the "management functions" provision in Warrior & Gulf.
Actually, in my judgment, the court's conclusion was predicated
basically on rather extensive Company evidence concerning past
Union attempts to incorporate into the contract a specific limitation
on subcontracting. This evidence was pretty impressive. Whether it
was sufficient, coupled with the other grounds relied upon by the
court, to distinguish it from Warrior &. Gulf seems to be doubtful,
although, as has been already indicated, I interpret the 1960 decisions
as leaving it open to the courts to decide against arbitrability if
there is clear and convincing evidence, either within or without the
labor agreement, that the parties have left the matter within the
area of managerial discretion.
There is one decision by a federal district court in Wisconsin" on
the "subcontracting" issue that appears clearly incorrect in its interpretation of Warrior & Gulf. In a suit brought by the Union for
a' 2

86

F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1960, as amended 1961).

9 186 F. Supp. 895 (D.N.D. 1960). The agreement contained a broad "no-strike"
provision. The arbitration clause provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 8. Subject to the limitations set forth in the last two paragraphs
of this Section 8, if any question concerning the interpretation or application
of any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement is not settled as a result
of negotiations between the Refinery Manager, or those designated by him,
and the Union, within a period of fifteen (15) calendar days or within an
extension of that time mutually agreed upon, the Union or the Company
may refer the question for arbitration. ...
It is understood and agreed, however, that proposals to add to or change
this Agreement shall not be arbitrable and that no proposal to modify, amend
or terminate this Agreement, as well as any matter or subject arising out of
or in connection with such proposal, may be referred for arbitration under
this Section.
Questions concerning any liability or obligation of the Company which
require the construction or interpretation of any statute or law; for example
but not by way of limitation, Fair Labor Standards Act, Workmen's Compensation Laws, Labor Management Relations Act, and Social Security Laws, shall
not be eligible for processing under the grievance procedure.
40
UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 193 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1961).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

a declaratory judgment concerning the right of the employer to
contract out janitorial work where the contract contained no arbitration provisions, and the Court therefore obviously had to interpret
the contract, it held that the recognition, seniority, and no-lockout
provisions of the contract prohibited the subcontracting and that
this was a result dictated as a matter of law, by Warrior &q Gulf.
After a necessarily incomplete search of arbitration decisions (in-

complete since relatively few are reported) I found one case in which
the arbitrator appears to have read the Supreme Court's decision in
like fashion.41 The arbitrator stated, "Where the Agreement does
not allow contracting out, the employer may not unilaterally contract out work within the job classifications covered by the Agreement," citing Warrior &q Gulf. The error in the approach, of course,
is that the Supreme Court did not purport to rule on the merits of
the "subcontracting issue." Certainly an arbitrator, so far as the
Court is concerned, is free to decide this issue either way.
Another question of considerable interest, and obvious importance,
is whether arbitration, in lieu of litigation, is the contractually appropriate and required method of resolving a claim made by the
employer that the union has breached the no-strike clause of the
labor agreement. Here, the sixth and seventh circuits have held
that the employer's claim of violation, and for damages by way of
relief, do not involve kinds of issues which are subject to arbitration
under the grievance arbitration clause, and the judges of the second
circuit are equally divided on the point." With some misgivings, I
suggest that such a claim, as three of the second circuit judges believe, does present an issue which should be permitted to go to
arbitration, under the authority of the Warrior & Gulf and companion cases, at least if the grievance and arbitration provisions of
the labor agreement permit grievances to be filed against the union."
41 Vulcan Rivet & Bolt Corp. and United Steelworkers of America, C.C.H. Lab. Arb.
Awards, 1961-1962, 5 8475 (1961). Cf. Volunteer Elec. Co-op. and IUEW, 36 L.A. 787,
C.C.H. Lab. Arb. Awards, 1961-1962, 5 8417, in which L. Drew Redden, Chairman
of the Arbitration Board stated that while Warrior F9 Gulf "removes any doubt concerning the arbitrability of this issue in cases where the collective bargaining agreement
contains a 'no strike' clause, and may tend to put an end to arbitration decisions holding
that management has an absolute right to contract work out in the absence of an express
prohibition in the collective bargaining agreement, it is not felt that it will have a substantial impact in the majority of cases. This conclusion results from the impression
of the writer that most arbitrators already conceive that there are limits to the power
of the company to contract out work" (emphasis added).
Mr. Redden continued: "The decision certainly is not authority for concluding that
subcontracting is a violation of the collective bargaining agreement per se. On the
contrary, it actually does nothing to disturb the rule that the one who maintains that
contracting work out is a violation of a contract containing no express provision against
such activity must demonstrate that the violation exists."
4 See cases cited in note 35 supra.
4 See Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 673 (1961).
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At the same time, it is seriously doubted that the parties to the
typical collective bargaining agreement contemplated that the arbitration process was to be used to enforce a no-strike agreement, and
it would be no surprise to find some arbitrators rejecting jurisdiction.
Still another problem of substantial interest, of a very different
nature, is whether, with respect to contracts which could be the
subject of federal jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, the state courts are ousted of jurisdiction, and, if not, whether
they remain free to apply any aspects of local law. Lincoln Mills
declared quite clearly that federal law was to be developed under
Section 301 and was to be controlling." This does not, of itself, mean
that state courts lose jurisdiction of litigation concerning labor
agreements, but they must apply federal substantive law, at least if
they can find out what it is. The California Supreme Court, in Posner
v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc.,"s recently had before it the question of
judicial jurisdiction over arbitrability issues. The court indicated that
it was adopting the federal view, as expressed in Warrior & Gulf
and associated cases, but not necessarily all the implications of these
decisions, thus appearing to reserve the right to disagree in some
respects. However, the court was developing or applying California
law only. It considered that it was not bound to apply federal substantive law since there was no showing that the employer was engaged in interstate commerce. Subsequently, a California lower court,
purporting to follow Posner, held that Section 301 of Taft-Hartley
does not oust state courts of jurisdiction to handle arbitrability
issues, but that state courts must apply the substantive law developed
by the federal courts. 6 The issue, an intriguing one, was whether
the union, after a vain effort to obtain a wage increase pursuant to
a "wage reopener" in the labor agreement, could arbitrate the matter.
"The

opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas states, 353 U.S. at 456-57:
The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits
under Sec. 301(a)? We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits
under Sec. 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national laws. . . . The range of judicial inventiveness will be
determined by the nature of the problem. . . . Federal interpretation of the
federal law will govern, not state law. . . . But state law, if compatible with
the purpose of Sec. 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that
will best effectuate the federal policy. . . . Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source
of private rights.
4543 C.C.H. Lab Cas. 5 50306 (1961).
It should be noted, however, that the
Court was declaring California law in a case in which there was no claim that the
federal law was controlling. As stated in the opinion, "This federal rule is not binding
on this court in the instant case because petitioner failed to allege that the employer was
engaged in interstate commerce. Moreover, the trial court found the employer's allegation
(in an affirmative defense) that it was engaged in interstate commerce to be false."
46 Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
50345
(Calif. App. 1961).
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The court upheld an award of a five per cent hourly wage increase.
An Alabama court, while implying acceptance of the proposition
that it is bound by federal substantive law in suits for breach of a
labor agreement, held it was not compelled to grant specific enforcement of the arbitration clause, since this is a matter of remedy,
and the remedy is prohibited by Alabama law,"7 a result which I
suggest is highly dubious.
At least one judge has indicated a complete lack of enthusiasm
for the Warrior & Gulf trilogy. In Volunteer Elec. Co-op. v. Gann,"s
the Tennessee courts were asked to decide whether, under a "standard" type arbitration clause, the employer could be required to
arbitrate the layoff of certain employees. The trial court held that
the contract gave management "full discretion" in the matter, and
that there was no issue to be arbitrated. This was prior to Warrior
& Gulf. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, subsequent to Warrior &4
Gulf, reversed "under what we believe to be a mandate of controlling
federal decision in this field." In a concurring opinion Judge Hale
indicated his profound distaste for this state of affairs, stating that
"in my humble judgment the U. S. Supreme Court was in grievous
error" and that its decisions "represent only the ipse dixit of the
Supreme Court, supporting by neither reason nor authority," and
that, in requiring the arbitration even of frivolous claims, the decisions are "blows to the independence of the judiciary, a further
evisceration of the Tenth Amendment, and another long step down
the road toward state socialism, so roundly condemned by critics of
the 'Warren Supreme Court'."
This completes the survey of judicial reaction to the 1960 decisions.
I conclude that the Supreme Court's adjudications have probably had
a substantial impact in reducing judicial intervention with the
arbitration process, but have not put the issue completely to rest.
There cannot, in fact, be any final or neat delineation of the roles
of the judge and the arbitrator so long as, under our law, the ultimate
issue of arbitrability is for the courts to decide. One weakness, however, in the Supreme Court's approach, insofar as it was elucidated,
lay in a failure to differentiate between the pre- and post-arbitration
posture of the problem. Both the process of arbitration, and preservation of the ultimate authority of the courts, would be best
served if the courts would never (or at least hardly ever) intervene
prior to arbitration. Experience shows that the issue of "arbitrability"
"'Byars v. National Dairy Products Corp. Div., 42 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
1961).
4' 41 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 16537 (Tenn. App. 1960).

5
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can safely be left to competent arbitrators in the first instance with
assurance of a careful treatment of the problem. Moreover, if the
challenge to the arbitrator's jurisdiction is made following the
award, the court will at least have the benefit of the arbitrator's
thinking, and the arbitration process will not have been interrupted
before it began. Perhaps legislation will be necessary to produce this
kind of differentiation, although I should suppose that the Supreme
Court, in its role of developing applicable federal law under Section
301, could develop such a rule.
V. IMPACT OF THE 1960 DECISIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

I should have supposed, even without checking, that management,
and perhaps even unions, have found much that is disturbing about
these cases, especially some of the dicta contained in the opinions.
Management may question whether they are any longer "safe"
against unwanted and, as they would say, improper arbitral intrusions
on their authority insofar as they have relied on a "reversed rights"
theory of the labor agreement or a general type of "management
rights" clause. It seems as if some would be strongly tempted to
try to amend their agreements to write in detailed and very specific
provisions defining subject matter reserved within the area of managerial discretion, and concerning which there is to be no arbitral
jurisdiction. Yet, there are doubtless countervailing considerations.
One is the risk that elaborate specification of reserved rights may fortify the argument that some matter not specified is subject to grievance and arbitration under the contract. Another is the risk that to
press for inclusion of such provisions, and to fail, may become relevant
and, for the employer, damaging "background" in the thinking of
some arbitrator or judge. Still another is the obvious point that the
bargaining price or quid pro quo might be thought to be too high.
I have previously suggested the possibility that "a more viable
alternative might be a management effort to write into the contract
an arbitration clause which, although cast in general terms, might
be specific enough to enable or induce courts, consistently with
the 1960 decisions, to decide against arbitrability in particular cases."
I also suggested speculation about the efficacy of clauses which
might be worded as follows:
Example 1. There may be submitted to arbitration any dispute involving a claim alleging a violation of any provision or provisions of
this agreement, provided the claim does not involve an unreasonable,
capricious, or clearly untenable interpretation of the agreement. [Perhaps the word "frivolous" could be added.]
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Example 2. There may be submitted to arbitration any dispute involving a claim alleging a violation of any provision or provisions of
this agreement, provided the subject matter of the claim is specifically
treated by the provision or provisions cited in support of the claim.
Example 3. [A "standard" arbitration clause, to which is appended
the following:] "Provided, however, that, if the Company contends
that this agreement contains no obligation, express or implied, which
could support the claim, arbitration shall not proceed until there has
been a judicial determination that the agreement does import such
obligation."
Example 4. It is agreed that management retains all rights of decision
which are not circumscribed by some specific provision or provisions
of this agreement.
Needless to say, these suggestions have succeeded in provoking discussion, but I could detect nothing resembling a consensus.
For some time, various management groups and lawyers have
pondered what, if anything, to do about the contract in order to
"meet the problem" of the 1960 decisions. Certain of these groups
have issued advisory publications on the subject.4 However, with
all deference to their efforts, I thought it might be interesting, and
perhaps profitable, to take my own sampling of private opinion.
For this purpose, about seventy-five lawyers were selected, mostly
representing management, in addition to a few industrial relations
vice-presidents, who are persons of very considerable competence and
experience in handling collective bargaining matters, and who, I felt,
would give my inquiries thoughtful consideration and would respond
with candor. They were assured their answers would be kept in
confidence, in that they would not be identified. Frankly, I envisaged the possibility that the answers received might be more
indicative of "the facts of life" about managerial reflection on our
subject than is revealed by the publications of specific management
associations or groups. My correspondents were asked to respond to
the following inquiries:
(1) Whether managements, as a result of the Supreme Court's de-

cisions, have considered that it would be desirable, if possible, to try
to negotiate changes in the arbitration, management functions, or other
clauses; and, if so, what kinds of changes have been considered desirable;
(2) Whether any such changes have actually been proposed to unions
in negotiating contract revisions, and, if so, what kinds of changes have
been proposed;
4 Model Arbitration Clauses to Protect Management Rights, published by the
Labor Relations and Legal Department, Chamber of Commerce of the United States
(1961); Arbitration-A New Direction?, Industrial Relations Memo No. 136, published
by Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc. (1960).
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(3) The outcome of such proposals.

I received about fifty replies; most of them being detailed, thoughtful, and frank, to a degree beyond my fondest expectations. A verbatim reproduction of these statements would be most interesting
and valuable; however, this would be beyond the scope of this
Article. I am unable to give you this. The most I can do is to indicate, in general terms, the kinds of reactions I received, and to append to this Article, with identification of source, some of the specific
comments and suggestions, especially of contract provisions proposed or considered desirable.
The replies indicate that there has been no uniform pattern of
reaction to the 1960 decisions on the question of the desirability of
trying to negotiate "tightening" provisions into the agreement. With
some exceptions, the larger companies, especially those with extensive experience in umpire arbitration systems, appear not to be
greatly disturbed by the decisions, and to be disinclined to seek
ameliorating contract changes. One representative of a very large
multi-plant company stated that if they were just beginning their
relationship with the union, "prudence might demand that we
attempt to include certain safeguards in the contract." However, he
stated, the parties have had an arbitration procedure in their contracts for many years, resulting in "several thousand Umpire decisions, and this has created a body of case law which furnishes the
parties with a relatively predictable answer to most of our day-today problems, including the probable limits of the arbitrator's
authority." Moreover, this company, to quote my correspondent
further, "basically deems it undesirable to settle labor relations administration matters in the courts." One law firm which has a large
practice representing companies of substantial size indicates that
they, together with other management attorneys, met to discuss the
desirability of redrafting arbitration clauses, and "arrived at nothing
constructive except to recommend a publicity campaign urging
labor arbitrators to continue to exercise self-restraint in approaching the issue of arbitrability." The smaller companies and their
representatives seem on the whole, again with some exceptions, to
be more concerned-in some instances, very much so.
The range of general reaction is wide indeed. There is, at one end
of the spectrum, the benign, casual, or perhaps, sophisticated approach already indicated, particularly on the part of some of the
representatives of the larger firms with wide arbitration experience.
In part this is based upon the feeling that their contracts already
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give them substantial protection against undue infringement upon
the managerial functions they wish to preserve. In part it is based
upon their preference for arbitration over strike action or litigation. 0
Another reaction is that, while the 1960 decisions may make arbitration a more risky venture, it would be unwise to make moves which
would look toward judicial intervention as the solution to the problem." As stated by the industrial relations vice-president of a large
company, "arbitration is basically an extra-legal process and once
it gets into the courts much of its value is lost." One of my correspondents, who represents, typically, rather small companies, is so
firmly convinced of the value of the arbitration process that he favors
"having the issue of arbitrability determined by the arbitrator" in
all cases, as a matter of principle. (I should add that he doesn't have
much company in this view.) At the other end of the spectrum,
however, is the "alarmist" view, which is held by many. To these
people, the decisions open up frightening prospects of uncontrollable
union infringement, through arbitration, upon basic managerial
" A member of a law firm with an extensive practice in the automotive parts industry writes:
I think that to be factual I would have to say that the three Supreme
Court decisions . . . have had no particular effect in the three areas listed
in your letter. I think that the reason for this is that in the companies with
which I work and which have arbitration clauses, the problem of litigating
any question arising from arbitration clauses has fortunately never arisen.
On a few rare occasions companies have mildly considered attempting a court
review, either of the arbitrability of a particular question, or of the merits
of an arbitrator's decision. I do not recall any occasion in my experience
where either the company or the Union refused to arbitrate a question in
direct violation of the established contractual grievance procedure. In other
words both the companies and the Unions with which I have had experience
have used the arbitration process as the final and binding decision on all
matters arising under the contract which were matters subject to arbitration.
There has been no serious attempt to enlist the support of a court, either
to frustrate or to carry out the agreed on arbitration system.
To the extent that I have talked to other persons, such as labor lawyers,
company officials, or Union officials, their experience tends to parallel mine.
In fact the only comment I have ever heard on the subject is an expression
of relief at the fact that we have never in this area fallen into the unfortunate habit which prevails in some parts of the east, and particularly in
New York State, where a great volume of arbitration questions has been
submitted to the court.
A member of a large eastern law firm writes:
I think that the general feeling is that Warrior E Gulf has made it even
more important to have capable, impartial arbitrators; but most companies
are willing to take their chances on final and binding arbitration because it
provides a means for finally settling employee grievances.
5 See comment in note 50 supra. Another eastern attorney, who counsels companies
and also does a substantial amount of arbitrating, writes:
From my own experience in negotiating contracts, whether it be a
Labor Union Contract or a Commercial Contract, I do not like to see the
arbitrator's jurisdiction restricted. Rather, I believe that the parties basically
prefer to have an arbitrator rule on the problems that may arise rather
than have the matter drag through the Courts or the Labor Board.
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functions, and every effort must be made to confront the problem

and do something about it."
The "returns" which I have received on the question of whether

managements have actually proposed, or will propose, contract
changes to try to meet the problem, as they view it, of the 1960
decisions, likewise reveal varying reactions. In many instances, the

ultimate decision seems to be not to press the matter. The reasons
given include (a) the fear of introducing additional complications
2 The following comments are illustrative:

Just off hand, it seems to me that if all doubts are to be resolved in favor of
arbitrability, we cannot afford to permit a doubt to remain after we reduce
an agreement to writing. This is going to call for some real skill and care in
writing grievance procedure and arbitration clauses. (an industrial relations
Vice-President).
It would seem to me that in light of the several Supreme Court decisions,
management would want to do everything they could to strengthen the
management's rights clause and to delimit the areas which might be exposed
to the whims or caprices of an arbitrator. (Another industrial relations VicePresident).
I don't know how any lawyer can reliably advise a client as to the
meaning and application of a collective-bargaining agreement containing the
customary arbitration provisions, when, according to Mr. Justice Douglas, we
purportedly must concern ourselves with how an arbitrator might view the
effect of a particular construction upon such nebulous standards "as the
effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequences to the morale
of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished.
1 (Warrior 46 L.R.R.M. at 2419). This is government by emotionnot law. The Physician's stethoscope, the tube of mercury and the pneumatic
arm-wrap would now appear to be more appropriate toolsof the legal
profession than all our labor-law libraries. Perhaps we should counsel that,
considering the propensities of a particular client's employees to "blow their
tops," the advice to one client is that the case for arbitration should be
evaluated as "systolic, 275; diastolic, 190," whereas, under the same set of
facts and contract terms of another employer, whose labor force would
never "rupture a blood vessel," we would evaluate the case as "135/80."
I am telling my clients that considerable thought should be given to
revision of contract terms to limit and confine the effect of these decisions,
but the reaction I have been getting from several clients is that of throwing
out the whole arbitration process as the safest way of dealing with this
problem. I believe that reaction is going to show up in several of our negotiations in the next six to eight months.
Up until these cases were decided I had always been a strong advocate
of the arbitration of grievance disputes. I told many of my clients that
arbitration represented a substitute of the rule of law for the rule of force.
For example, our firm has one manufacturing client (for whom we are about
to start renegotiations) to whom I have preached this theme over the years,
having suggested "arbitration" as a means of reducing grievance strikes, of
which they have had a few. I think I had that client "sold" until the management learned about the United Steel worker cases from their trade journal.
The client now has absolutely no intention of proposing or agreeing to arbitration. Their attitude is that suffering a grievance strike or two during a
contract term is a small price to pay for avoiding the risks of arbitration
under the law as it now stands. (A lawyer with a substantial practice representing medium-sized employers).
As a result of the Supreme Court decisions, management people have become
very much concerned as to the future of labor arbitration. I don't know
of any development in the past several years that has disturbed them more.
(A Washington, D.C. lawyer).
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into the bargaining process, (b) the concern that a successful attempt
to write into the contract detailed reservations of management
rights, or detailed limitations on the subjects of possible arbitration,
might, as one individual puts it, "broaden rather than narrow the
scope of arbitrability by raising a presumption in its favor for the
named exceptions," and (c), as another of my correspondents states
it, "the fear of being turned down and that it will be held against
them later-preferring to take their changes on their present contracts.'"" On the other hand, a substantial number of my correspondents indicate that contract changes have been or will be proposed.
The degree of success with the unions has not been outstanding, apparently, but in some instances contract changes have been made.
My "returns" also show a considerable range of thought, among
those who are seriously concerned, about the substantive implications of the 1960 decisions, and how to meet the problem in terms
of contract provisions. As might be supposed, the question of "management rights" (how they are or may be affected, whether a "management rights" clause is now indispensable, and, if so, how it
should be phrased) is a matter of general interest. The most usual
reaction is that such a clause is more essential now than ever before,
and that it should be both general and specific, with a detailed
specification of matters reserved for managerial decision. These people
" This is a rather common reaction. Thus, one very knowledgeable management
attorney states that, as a lawyer, he had to advise a certain client that, in view of
the Warrior F Gulf and companion decisions, "despite contract legislative history and
consistent practice, we might be obliged to submit to an arbitrator's review and veto
power our subcontracting decisions; that the only way to provide us with complete
protection in this area was to secure the union's agreement that there be included in the
contract, particularly in its arbitration clause, a provision acknowledging that questions
relating to subcontracting were not to be arbitrable." However, he said, "having done
our duty as lawyers, we then undertook to offer a judgment as negotiators. We said to
our client that it was impossible to conceive that the union would consent to a positive
exclusion from the contract, or its arbitration clause, grievances relating to subcontracting.
We further said that were we to make such a proposal, the company would have to
reconcile itself to a willingness to take a strike over the union's anticipated refusal to
agree to our demand, for having made the proposal we would be bound to see it to a
successful conclusion in order to avoid having our own 'implied' argument subsequently
turned against us." The ultimate bargaining tactic determined upon was to let the
union, as it had in the past, continue to press for the inclusion of a specific provision
limiting subcontracting, and for management to continue to reject any such proposal.
Others of my correspondents seem to have felt similar concern about the possible
adverse implications of "contract legislative history," and thus have advised or followed
the tactic of letting the union make the proposals in the area. The logic of this approach
would suggest that, tactically, neither party, in an area of uncertainty as to the nature
or extent of existing, or pre-existing limitations on the managerial prerogative, would
make a specific proposal unless the party considering the proposal is prepared to make
sure it is successful. This is obviously an unsatisfactory state of affairs in view of the
very real difficulty which arbitrators have in determining what, if any, implied limitations
exist with respect to the exercise of a function such as subcontracting. If subcontracting,
for example, is a real problem to either party, it should be put on the bargaining table,
and, if possible, resolved.
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obviously feel that the so-called "reserved rights" or "every right we
haven't given away we still retain" approach has been seriously undermined. Some management representatives, however, still believe
this latter approach to be sound, and would still exclude from the
agreement any kind of "management rights" clause, despite the
pertinent and, to them, disturbing dictum expressed in the majority
opinion in Warrior 0 Gulf." Among the more interesting specific
suggestions received concerning the "management rights" clause, the
following should be included:
1. Use a broad clause, coupled with a detailed list of reserved rights.
Include a provision to the effect that management will exercise its reserved rights in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously. Place in
the arbitration clause a provision limiting the arbitrator's authority,
when the exercise of a reserved right is challenged, to a determination
whether the Company acted in good faith, or arbitrarily or capriciously."
"Illustrative is the following comment:
One further comment-neither as lawyer nor negotiator have I ever
been overly fond of management clauses. More often than not, I think
they represent traps for management. I should prefer to think that since,
in the nature of things, the company ordinarily initiates action, its action
is not challengeable except on the basis of some contractual provision, express
or reasonably implied. To bargain with the union over the right to initiate
action has always seemed to me more a limitation than a freedom on this
exercise. (A New York attorney).
5 A "management rights" clause which was negotiated by one of my correspondents
for an insurance company provides:
The Company has and retains the exclusive right to manage and control its
business, except as all such rights are clearly and specifically limited by this
agreement. The Company agrees that it will exercise all such rights in good
faith and for legitimate business purposes and not arbitrarily or capriciously
or for the purpose of discriminating unfairly against or in favor of individual
agents, except that promotions to positions excluded from this agreement
shall rest in the sole and unfettered discretion of the Company. Included in
such rights, this enumeration being merely by way of illustration and not
by way of limitation, are the following
12. Rules and regulations for the conduct of agents in their relationship
with the Company, other agents, the public, policyholders and prospects.
13. To change at any time Company business practices, and Company
policies and rules including practices, policies and rules relating to the
above matters.
The arbitration clause of the contract included the following:
The Arbitrator shall have no power to add to, subtract from or modify or
change any of the provisions of this agreement, nor any practice, policy or
rule of the Company. His power shall be limited to deciding whether the
Company has violated the express terms of this agreement, and he shall not
imply obligations and conditions binding upon the Company from this
agreement, it being understood that any matter not specifically set forth
herein remains within the reserved rights of the Company. In any case in
which it is alleged that the Company has exercised its rights arbitrarily or
capriciously, or for the purpose of discriminating unfairly against or in favor
of individual agents, the power of the arbitrator shall be limited to deciding
whether or not the Company's action was in fact taken in good faith and
for legitimate purposes, or was taken arbitrarily and capriciously or for the
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2. Include among the specifically reserved rights the right to make
inter-plant transfers of work, to open new plants and freely select employees for such plants, to improve work methods, and to install new
machinery."
Another interesting view expressed holds that management must
rely more on the arbitration clause, and upon specific exclusions of
arbitral jurisdiction therein, rather than upon broad or detailed
"management rights" clauses, to obtain protection against
improper
usurpation of authority by the arbitrator. As stated by one writer:
It has been my conclusion, apparently shared by the clients with
whom I have spoken and other management representatives, that management must carefully limit the definition of a grievance and carefully describe the function of an arbitrator in order to avoid challenge
to functions which management considers should be its prerogative.
Expansion of the management rights clause would not seem to limit
the arbitrability of any issue, although of course it might cause an
arbitrator to sustain a management determination ...
There is a fairly good theoretical basis for this view, quite apart from
the obvious point, perhaps in part psychological, that specific restrictions on arbitral jurisdiction are likely to be scrutinized very
carefully both by arbitrators and by courts. A "management rights"
provision, however detailed, must be read in the light of the other
provisions of the agreement, and of the legal basis of the collective
bargaining relationship, and is thus more likely to contain ambiguities than carefully drawn provisions excluding specific subject matter
from arbitral jurisdiction. A distinctly minority opinion expressed
grave skepticism about the practicality of attempts to negotiate into
the arbitration clause specific exclusionary provisions. One writer
expressing this view states that any such provision "can become
excessively cumbersome and still not accomplish what is desired," and
that, in his experience, trying to negotiate such provisions "led to
needless arguments, frequently about rather ridiculous hypothetical
situations." Certain of the specific suggestions made by those who
take the more prevalent view including the following:
1. Limit the arbitrator's authority to the interpretation and application of "those limitations upon management functions in the form of
purpose of discriminating unfairly against or in favor of individual agents,
and the arbitrator shall have no power to substitute his judgment or discretion for that of the Company as to the reasonableness of the exercise of any
such rights or of any practice, policy or rule of the Company.
My correspondent sent me an arbitration decision involving a challenge to Company
action in requiring insurance agents to surrender their collection books to the Company
every Thursday afternoon. It is quite clear that the arbitrator, in rejecting the agrievance,
took account of the limitations on his power.
"Some
of the types of "management rights" clauses advocated, and, in certain
instances, in effect, are set out in Appendix A.
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rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other conditions of employment
as set forth in the express terms of this Agreement."
2. Provide that a grievance must specify the particular contract
provision or provisions alleged to have been violated.
3. Provide that the arbitrator's award, "in conformity with his
jurisdiction" (or, alternatively, "provided it is within the jurisdiction
and authority vested in him pursuant to this agreement") shall be final
and binding.
4. Provide for judicial review of the question of arbitrability and
perhaps other grounds for judicial review."'
5. Exclude from the arbitrator's jurisdiction any claims based on the
location or relocation of plants and the scheduling of production.
6. Do not include a provision permitting the Company to file a
grievance. (This suggestion is made as a means of avoiding the possibility of having to arbitrate instead of litigate the Union's violation
of its no-strike pledge.)
7. Provide that, where a question of arbitrability is raised before the
arbitrator, he must decide this issue only, and that if the claim is held
arbitrable, it must be presented to a different arbitrator for a decision
on its merits."
8. Resist any union proposal to insert in the contract a provision
permitting the arbitration of grievances based upon an alleged "past
practice."
9. Provide that the arbitrator shall have the authority only to decide
whether a specific, express provision of the contract has been violated,
and shall not have the authority "to supplement or modify this contract by reference to any 'industrial common law' or 'Federal labor
policy,' or any source or concept other than the contract as written
by the parties," and that, he "shall utilize only such methods and
standards of interpretation as would be used by a court of law in the
State of
in construing an ordinary commercial contract."
It need hardly be added that some of these proposals seem to be both
ridiculous and obviously impossible of achievement in collective
bargaining as a practical matter."s
Most of my correspondents who think something must or should
57 A proposal made by one Company (and rejected by the Union) included the
following orovision in the arbitration clause:
The decision of the arbitrator, provided it is within the jurisdiction and
authority vested in him pursuant to this agreement, shall be final and binding
upon the parties. The arbitrator's decision shall always be subject to review
and challenge by appropriate action in a court or administrative tribunal of
competent jurisdiction on the ground that it was outside of his authority
or jurisdiction, made without due process, nor supported by substantial evidence, or that it was arbitrary and capricious.
" One correspondent states:
I am firmly of the belief that it is wrong to permit an arbitrator to determine arbitrability and then to permit him to hear and decide the case. As
a matter of economics and as a matter of pride an arbitrator can't help
but be influenced in favor of arbitrability.
51 Some detailed grievance and arbitration provisions
advocated, and in certain
instances in effect, are set out in Appendix B.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

be done to meet the problem of the 1960 decisions advocate attention both to the "management rights" and to the arbitration clauses.
Other specific suggestions include the following:
1. Eliminate any "preamble" or "purpose" clause, on the theory
that such provisions may induce the arbitrator to "roam."
2. Include in the contract a "complete agreement" or "wrap up"
clause, which will provide, illustratively, that the instant agreement
supersedes "all prior agreements and understandings, oral or written,
express or implied, between the parties" and "shall be the sole source of
any and all rights or claims which either party may assert against the
other in arbitration hereunder.
3. Include the usual broad provision by which each party waives the
right to bargain on matters not covered by the contract, or, except
through proper recourse to the grievance procedure, on matters covered
by the contract.
4. Limit seniority rights of employees to the existing plant and
location, or to any new plant within some stated area of proximity to
the existing plant (presumably in order to avoid claims of rights to
jobs in a new plant in a different area).
5. Resist any attempt by the union to write into the contract an
express limitation on the right to contract out work; do not propose
the inclusion of a specific provision reserving the right to contract out
work unless management is prepared to take a strike to force its inclusion; if such a provision is to be proposed, be sure that it gives
management the right to make the decision on "economic" grounds,
among others.
Still another view, held by several of my correspondents, is that
the only really effective way of dealing with the issues presented by
the 1960 decisions is either to eliminate arbitration altogether from
the agreement or else to make it wholly "voluntary" in the sense that
a grievance may be submitted to arbitration only if the parties
specifically agree on the submission. Persons taking either position
realize, of course, that the union, in the event it accepts either proposal, will have to be accorded the right to strike on an unsettled
grievance.
While there is some evidence of concern over what is described by
one of my correspondents as "the developing theories or 'common
law' of arbitrators," and with the Supreme Court's apparent support for "wide angle" approaches to the interpretative process, a
number of my correspondents indicate that they have not detected
a tendency on the part of arbitrators to be influenced in their philosophies or approaches by the 1960 decisions. Perhaps some cynic might
say all this means is that "roving" arbitrators simply continue their
peregrinations, comforted, now, by what Mr. Justice Douglas said.
However, this is not what my correspondents mean, at least not
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all of them. They say, in effect, that responsible arbitrators continue
to be responsible. Indeed, one lawyer reports that arbitrators are
"now more circumspect in their reasoning and language to retain at
least the aura of the judicial approach."
Another rather interesting reaction, expressed by several of my
correspondents, is that management has more reason to be disturbed
by certain recent judicial decisions on substantive issues than by the
1960 decisions on arbitrability. Mention is made in this connection
of the Glidden" and Oddie6" decisions, in which it was held that
where a plant is closed down in one area and another is opened in
a different, and even distant, area, the employees in the closed plant
have individual contractual rights of re-employment at the new
location. Perhaps, if substantive issues of this kind are decided in
this fashion by the courts, we will witness a switch of positions as
between management and labor on the relative advantages of litigation and arbitration!
This completes the survey of managerial reaction to the 1960
decisions. The views of union representatives or their lawyers were
not solicited since it was taken for granted that, generally speaking,
they would applaud at least the results in the cases if not all the
expressions in the majority opinions. It is obvious, however, that
union and management negotiators face some common problems
and may have some common interests. If, as indicated by a number
of my management correspondents, to propose a specific provision
and to fail to gain its acceptance involves a substantial risk that some
arbitrator will rely on this record in support of a reading of the contract in a manner adverse to the interests of the proposer, the same
can be said of union proposals which are not accepted. The union
obviously is concerned with the question whether arbitration, in
lieu of strike action, shall be the exclusive method of settling
grievances. The union likewise may become increasingly interested
in the availability of judicial review if, as some of the more recent
court decisions indicate, there should be a developing tendency toward a liberal construction of the labor agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION

The 1960 decisions correctly, at least in my judgment, limited the
role of the courts in reviewing questions of arbitrability. This should
presumably strengthen the arbitration process by giving it a more
secure legal base. Yet there is evidence that to some extent, at least,
"Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961).
' Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 43 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 5 17069 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
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the process has been, or will be, weakened through contractual limitations on the arbitrator's authority. The parties should face up honestly
and realistically again to the basic question of whether arbitration of
grievances is preferable to the alternatives of strike action or litigation. Arbitrators should exert some degree of self-restraint in the
exercise of their authority to decide their own jurisdiction and in
the determination of the merits of an issue. While, of necessity, their
decisions often both rely upon, and in turn become, a type of "industrial common law," arbitrators should not take as "gospel" all
of the "romanticisms"'' to be found in the majority opinions in the
1960 cases. They should remember that their responsibility, essentially, is to perform the task which the particular parties who
have employed them had in mind, and that the nature of the
authority conferred upon the arbitrator can vary from one contract
and its related industrial environment to another.
The basic point to be made, I believe, is that the 1960 decisions
place increased responsibility both upon the parties and upon the
arbitrator with respect to the arbitration process. The parties can
strengthen it or weaken it, since they control its very existence. The
arbitrator can add stature to the process, and help to preserve and
strengthen it, if he will exercise his authority with a genuine sense
of professional obligation. I take the view that the process is the
best available method for resolving differences which arise during
the life of the labor agreement. I hope both the parties and arbitrators will exercise their responsibilities to see that this, now commonly
accepted view, is preserved.

"2A term used by Professor Paul Hays in discussing the decisions. Hays, The Supreme

Court and Labor Law, October Term, 1959, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1960).

APPENDIX A
Selected "Management Rights" Clauses
Clause A
The management of the business and plant and the direction of the
working forces, including, but not limited to, the right to hire, suspend or
discharge for just cause, assign or transfer employees, adopt new or changed
methods of performing the work, prescribe reasonable general plant rules
and the right to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work, or for
other legitimate reasons, and to contract out work, is vested exclusively in
the Company, and the Company retains all rights that it legally had, subject
to the restrictions of law or a specific provision of this Agreement.
In the exercise of its rights, however, whether here enumerated, or here
or elsewhere retained, the Company agrees not to discriminate against any
member of the Union and to exercise its prerogatives for legitimate business reasons.

Clause B
The management of the Company's shipyard and the direction of the
working forces, the right to subcontract work, the right to hire, suspend or
discharge employees for cause, or transfer, and the right to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work, is vested exclusively in the
Company, subject to the terms of this Agreement.
Employees of sub-contractors of the Company performing work in the
shipyard, (which work at the time of signing this Agreement is being performed by employees of the Company in job classifications covered by this
Agreement), shall be paid not less than the minimum wage rates of such
job classifications as provided in this Agreement. The foregoing requirement shall not, however, be applicable to sub-contracts to which the
Company is committed prior to the execution of this Agreement.

Clause C
A. The Company retains the right to direct the working forces, including
the right to hire, suspend or discharge for proper cause, or transfer, the right
to establish and maintain work standards, and the right to relieve employees
from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons. The
foregoing, however, shall be exercised subject to the provision of this Agreement, including arbitration.
B. The Company shall have the exclusive right to manage the business
and plants and to decide on all matters pertaining to the products to be
manufactured, location of plants or operations, production schedules,
methods and means of manufacture, processes and materials to be used;
including the right to introduce new and improved methods or facilities
and to change existing methods or facilities. Insofar as a grievance relates
solely to the exercise by management of one of the exclusive rights of
management recognized in this paragraph B, such grievance shall not be
arbitrated or otherwise litigated. It is understood, however, that whenever
it is claimed that an act of management pursuant to this paragraph B
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results in a violation of some other provision of this Agreement, such claim
of violation of another provision of this Agreement, but not this paragraph
B, shall be subject to the grievance procedure of this Agreement, including
arbitration.

Clause D
Management shall continue to retain all rights held prior to the execution
of this Agreement, except as specifically modified by the Agreement; including, but not limited to, the right to:
prescribe operating and safety rules,
establish or change the consist of working crews,
institute measures designed to increase efficiency,
assign work to outside contractors for economic reasons,
establish working schedules,
manage and direct the working force,
establish and administer incentive plans, or
extend, limit, or curtail the operations or
to shut down completely when in its discretion it may deem it
advisable so to do.
It is understod that all management rights other than those specifically
surrendered by this Agreement are not subject to arbitration.

Clause E
Except to the extent expressly abridged by a specific provision of this
Agreement, the Company reserves and retains, solely and exclusively, all
of its inherent rights to manage the business, as such rights existed prior to
the execution of this or any previous agreement with the Union or any other
Union.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the sole and exclusive
rights of the Company which are not abridged by this Agreement include,
but are not confined to, the right to determine, and from time to time
redetermine, the number, location, and types of its operations, and the
methods, processes, and materials to be employed; to discontinue processes
or operations; or to discontinue their performance by employees of the
Company and to contract out any or all such processes or operations; to
determine the number of hours per day or per week operations shall be
carried on; and to select and determine the number and types of employees required and to assign work to such employees, subject only to the
requirement that they be properly compensated therefor.
The exercise by the Company of any of its exclusive rights shall not be
subject to arbitration hereunder, except with respect to a claim that such
right was exercised in bad faith for the purpose of damaging the Union.
Any policies and practices unilaterally adopted and followed, continued
or discontinued, by the employer pursuant to its right to manage the business are not subject to arbitration under this Agreement, with respect to
their application, interpretation, continuance or discontinuance, unless (a)
any such policy or practice expressly contravenes a specific provision of this
Agreement, or (b) the parties have expressly agreed on such policy or practice and have formally adopted it as part of their Agreement, or (c) the
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parties expressly agree to submit to arbitration a specific issue with respect
to such a policy or practice.
Clause F
(from the 1961 American Motors-UAW contract)
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS CLAUSE
The parties to this agreement recognize that they are engaged in a
common endeavor in which each of them has separate and distinct responsibilities which both of them are obligated to meet in a manner consistent
with their mutual overriding responsibility to the community as a whole.
The Union recognizes and respects the obligation of management to
obtain for the Company's stockholders a reasonable return on their investment and to assure the continued growth and prosperity of the Company.
The Company recognizes and respects the obligation of the Union to help
its members to protect and advance their welfare and to obtain for themselves and their families a fair share of the fruits of their labor. Both parties
recognize that they can best fulfill their separate obligations to stockholders
and employees, respectively, by conducting their relations with each other on
a cooperative basis that will make it possible to offer consumers a growing
volume of high quality products at reasonable prices.
To achieve these ends, each party recognizes that it must respect the
proper functions of the other.
The Union recognizes the right of management to maximum freedom
to manage consistent with due regard for the welfare and interests of the
employees.
Specifically, the Union agrees, in order to clarify its recognition of management functions belonging exclusively to the Company, not to request
the Company to bargain with respect to the following:
1. Any change or modification of management rights clauses contained
in the several working agreements with the respective local unions.
2. The right to determine the products to be manufactured, their design
and engineering, and the research thereon.
3. The right to determine all methods of selling, marketing, and advertising products, including pricing of products.
4. The right to make all financial decisions including but not limited to
the administration and control of capital, distribution of profits and dividends, mortgaging of properties, purchase and sale of securities, and the benefits and compensation of non-union-represented personnel, the financing and
borrowing of capital and the merger, reorganization or dissolution of the
corporation, together with the right to maintain the corporation's financial
books and records in confidence. This right includes the determination of
general accounting procedures, particularly the internal accounting necessary
to make reports to the owners of the business and to government bodies
requiring financial reports.
5. The right to determine the management organization of each producing or distributing unit and the selection of employees for promotion to
supervisory and other managerial positions.
The Company agrees, in order to clarify its recognition of functions
belonging exclusively to the Union, not to request the Union to bargain
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with respect to any matter involving the internal affairs, procedures, or
practices of the Union, including, but without limitation, such matters as
the amount or manner of levying initiation fees, dues, assessments and fines,
election or appointment of Union officers, stewards, committeemen, members of Union Committees or Union representatives, delegates to conventions or other Union functions, the individuals holding such positions,
procedures for formulation of demands, for deciding upon strike action or
other concerted action, and for ratification of agreements; provided, however, that this shall not preclude the Company from bringing to the attention of, and discussing with, the Union any matter which has bearing
on relations between them.
None of the foregoing shall be deemed to modify or limit any right
secured to either the Company or the Union in the National Economic
Agreement or the several Local Working Agreements.
The Union hereby agrees to relieve the Company from any obligation to
bargain or negotiate with respect to any of the matters mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs as matters with respect to which it will not request
the Company to bargain.
The Company recognizes, however, that decisions made pursuant to the
exercise of the management rights set forth above may have impact upon
employees. The Company, therefore, recognizes that it is a proper function
and a right of the Union to bargain, and the Company agrees that it will
discuss and bargain in good faith with the Union at the latter's request,
with respect to the impact of such decisions upon wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment or upon the convenience, welfare, interests, health, safety, security and dignity of employees and their families.
The Company will continue its past practice of advising and consulting
with the Union in advance of the effectuation of decisions having an impact
upon such matters. The Company further agrees that it will refrain from
assigning to unrepresented employees operations or functions presently performed by represented employees at the same location.
Insistence by the Company upon full compliance with this agreement
and with the management rights clauses in the said several Working Agreements shall not be an objective of or reason or cause for any strike, slowdown, work stoppage, walk-out, picketing, or other exercise of force or
threat thereof by the Union or any of its members; nor shall insistence by
the Union upon full compliance with this agreement and the provisions of
the National Economic Agreement or the several Local Working Agreements be an objective of or reason or cause for any lockout, or punitive, discriminatory or disciplinary action or other exercise of force or threat against
any employee; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph shall be
deemed to modify or limit any right secured to either the Company or the
Union in such agreements.
This Management Rights Clause shall remain in full force and effect, as
long as the Progress Sharing Plan as set forth herein or as hereafter amended
shall not have been terminated.

APPENDIX B
Selected Grievance and Arbitration Provisions
Clause I
33. Should grievances arise between the Company and the Union, or between the Company and any employee or employees, concerning the
meaning or application of any of the provisions of this Agreement
resulting from an alleged violation of this Agreement, there shall be
no strike or lock-out on account of such differences but an earnest
effort shall be made to settle such differences immediately in the following manner:
FIRST STEP- (Employee-Committeeman

to Foreman)

36. The written grievance shall briefly and specifically set forth the facts
relied upon and the relief requested.
SECOND STEP- (Committee Chairman and Company Representative)
39. The written appeal shall specify the respects in which the Agreement
is claimed to have been violated, the relief requested, and shall briefly
and specifically set forth the facts and reasons relied upon to justify a
reversal or modification of the appealed answer.
FOURTH STEP- (Arbitration)
48. Immediately upon selection of the arbitrator, copies of the grievance
and all written appeals and answers at each step of the processing and
a copy of the Agreement shall be submitted to him in a letter written
jointly by the parties requesting a hearing be held at a mutually convenient time and place.
49. If a work standard or a dispute about a wage rate for a classification
established by the Company during the term of the Agreement is appealed to arbitration, the arbitrator selected shall be a qualified Industrial Engineer.
50. Sometime after the arbitration appeal has been received but at least 5
days before the arbitration hearing the parties will meet and endeavor
to stipulate as many facts and issues as possible relative to the grievance.
Such stipulation as may be agreed upon shall be jointly signed and presented to the arbitrator prior to the arbitration hearing.
51. The arbitrator shall have only the functions set forth herein. His authority is confined to the interpretation and application of those limitations
upon management functions in the form of rates of pay, wages, hours
of work and other conditions of employment as set forth in the express
terms of this Agreement.
52. He shall have no power to establish or change provisions of this Agreement, or to establish or change the bargained wage rates except as
specifically provided for under the Special Procedure (Wage Rates).
This shall not preclude the arbitration of any individual's rate grievance
within the established wage rate structure.
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Clause II
X GRIEVANCES
A.

Should any employee or employees believe the Company has violated any
of the provisions, of this Agreement, he may initiate a grievance which
shall be processed in the following order:
1. Between the aggrieved employee or employees together with the
Department Committeeman and the Foreman of the department or
departments involved; if not settled, then,
2. Between the Shop Committee Chairman, Department Committeeman
and the Shop Superintendent; if not settled, then,
3. Between the Shop Committee Chairman, Co-Chairman and the Personnel Director. Grievances carried to this step must be reduced to
writing which shall specify the particular section of the Agreement,
if any, asserted to have been violated, the relief requested, the date
the grievance is claimed to have occurred, and the date it was first
presented. Answer must be given in writing. If not settled, then,
4. Between representatives of [the Union] and the Company management.
B. All alleged grievances must be presented promptly and in any event
must be presented in writing in step three (3) within thirty (30)
days of their asserted occurrence or they will be deemed waived.
Grievances presented in any step shall be acted upon by Company
representatives within three (3) working days after presentation, except
when additional time is required by the Company for investigation, in
which event the Union will be notified and a reasonable extension of
time will be granted.
C. Grievances not settled in any step shall be presented to the next succeeding step within five (5) days after the appropriate Company
representative communicates his decision to the employee or his Committeeman, or, if there has been an extension of additional time as
permitted by paragraph B, within five (5) days of the expiration of
such extension.
D. No Shop Chairman or Committeeman shall leave his job or department
for the purpose of handling grievances or for any other purpose under
this Agreement without first notifying his Foreman. Should the Foreman be unavailable, the Chairman or the Committeeman shall leave a
note at the Foreman's desk establishing the location of his visit. Such
Shop Chairman or Committeeman also shall notify the Foreman of the
department to be visited by him that the purpose of his visit is to discuss with an employee in said department a matter arising under this
Agreement.
XI ARBITRATION
Should a grievance alleging a violation of any provision of this contract fail
of settlement under the procedure provided for in Article X, it may be
submitted to arbitration as herein provided:
A. Within one (1) week of the failure of settlement of such a grievance
in step four (4) of the grievance procedure the Union may institute
arbitration by notifying the Company and the American Arbitration
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Association at Chicago, Illinois, in writing, of its desire so to do. The
procedure of the American Arbitration Association shall then be
utilized promptly for the selection of an Arbitrator, whose decision, if
in accordance with the provisions hereof, shall be final and binding.
B. The expenses of the Arbitrator shall be borne equally by the Company
and the Union. Each party shall bear its own expenses.
C. Arbitrators are to be bound by the following rules:
1. The Company has all rights which it had at common law except
those expressly limited by this Agreement.
2. The parties recognize that from time to time they may utilize the
grievance procedure for discussion of matters of believed mutual
interest and matters concerning or related to wages, hours and
working conditions which are not covered by any provision hereof.
Such discussion or treatment does not make a matter arbitrable.
3. No arbitration award shall be retroactive more than thirty (30)
days beyond the date upon which the grievance was first presented
to management in written form.
4. If the Arbitrator finds that a claim for relief is based upon circumstances which are not provided for under the Agreement, he
shall so find and dismiss the arbitration.
5. Company's resistance of or defense against grievances or arbitrations
on the grounds that employees were engaged in an illegal strike,
stoppage, slow-down or suspension of work shall not waive the
Company's right to pursue other legal avenues of relief. Company's
failure or refusal to arbitrate an arbitrable grievance shall not
waive the Union's right to pursue other legal avenues of relief.

Clause III
Arbitration Clause
1. The arbitration procedure hereinafter provided for shall extend only to
those issues which are arbitrable under this Agreement. In order for a
grievance to be arbitrable, (a) it must have been properly and timely processed through the grievance procedure; (b) it must genuinely involve
the interpretation or application of a specified provision or provisions of
this Agreement; (c) it must not rest on any alleged understanding, practice,
or other matter not part of this Agreement; and (d) it must not require
the arbitrator, in order to rule in favor of the grievance, to exceed the scope
of his jurisdiction under this Agreement.
2. The issue of arbitrability may be determined by the mutual agreement
of the parties with respect thereto; or by a court in an action to stay or
compel arbitration; or by an arbitrator, but only if the parties shall specially
agree to the submission of that issue to an arbitrator.
3. Either the Company* or the Union may elect to seek arbitration of any
arbitrable issue, and in that event shall proceed as follows:
(a) Within fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of disposition
of the grievance [or employer-raised question] in the final step of the
* Provision should be made in the grievance procedure for a procedure by which the
Company may raise (preferably in the final step of the grievance procedure) questions for
discussion, which, if not satisfactorily settled, may be arbitrated as here provided.
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grievance procedure, the party desiring arbitration shall so notify the
other party in writing, stating the issue proposed to be submitted to
arbitration, the provision or provisions of the Agreement on which the
claim rests or out of which the dispute arises, and the relief or remedy
sought.
(b) As soon as possible after receipt of such notice, the parties shall
meet for the purpose of drafting the submission agreement and selecting
an arbitrator. If the parties are unable thus to select an arbitrator, they
shall jointly request FMCS to furnish a panel of five names from which
the parties shall attempt to agree upon an arbitrator, utilizing, if necessary, the method of alternating strike-offs (the party seeking arbitration striking the first name), unless one party objects to all of the
names on the panel, in which event an additional panel of names shall be
requested and the parties shall proceed as above.
(c) If a question is raised concerning the arbitrability under the
Agreement of the issue sought to be arbitrated, and such question is not
otherwise decided, the parties by mutual agreement may submit this issue
alone to an arbitrator selected as provided above, and his decision on
such issue shall be final and binding. If in favor of arbitrability, such decision shall be followed by a hearing on the merits of the issue as soon
as another arbitrator can be selected and a hearing arranged. The fact that
a claim or dispute has been handled under the grievance procedure shall
not preclude either party from raising the question of arbitrability with
respect to such claim or dispute.
4. The arbitrator's jurisdiction to make an award shall be limited by the
submission and confined to the interpretation or application of specific provisions of this Agreement. The arbitrator shall not have jurisdiction to make
an award which has the effect of amending, altering, enlarging, or ignoring
any provision of this Agreement, nor shall he have jurisdiction to determine
any grievance on the basis of alleged practice or to determine that the
parties by practice or implication have amended or supplemented this
Agreement, unless the parties shall expressly submit to him the issue as to
whether such an agreement by practice or implication was made. The
arbitrator's award so made shall be final and binding.
5. The entire fee and expenses of the arbitrator shall be borne jointly
by the parties.
Clause IV
Grievance Procedure
SECTION 1. A 'grievance,' as the term is used in this Agreement, means
any dispute involving the proper application or interpretation of this Agreement.
SECTION 2. Step 1: The aggrieved employee, together with a representative of the Union if he so desires, shall attempt to settle the grievance by
discussing it with his Foreman. Any grievance not so presented within
seven (7) calendar days of the occurrence complained of shall be conclusively deemed to have been waived, and thereafter such grievance may
not be presented for consideration or made the basis for any action under
this agreement or otherwise.
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SECTION 3. Step 2. If the Foreman does not dispose of the grievance to
the satisfaction of the Union within three (3) calendar days of the time it
is presented to him, the Union may, within five (5) calendar days thereafter, appeal the matter by reducing the grievance to writing and presenting it to the Plant Superintendent. Within seven (7) calendar days of the
presentation of the written grievance, the Plant Superintendent shall answer
the grievance in writing.
Arbitration Procedure
SECTION 1. If the grievance is not settled to Union's satisfaction in accordance with the procedures set out in Article VIII, it may, within fourteen
(14) calendar days from the date of the Plant Superintendent's decision or
the expiration of the time to render such a decision, give written notice
of its desire to submit such grievance to arbitration.
SECTION 2. Company agrees to submit to arbitration, under the terms
of this Article, only grievances which satisfy all of the following conditions:
(a) The grievance was filed in writing during the life of this Agreement
and processed in the manner and within the time limits prescribed in
Article IX and Section 1 of this Article.
(b) The grievance involves either (1) a specific claim of a violation by
Company of an express provision of this Agreement, which raises a
bona fide issue regarding the proper application or interpretation of
such provision; or (2) a claim by an employee that he has been discharged or otherwise disciplined without just cause.
(c) The written grievance or notice of desire to arbitrate designates specifically the section or sections of this Agreement alleged to have been
violated.
SECTION 3. If the grievance satisfies all of the conditions prescribed by
Section 2 of this Article, Company and Union shall, within fourteen (14)
calendar days after Company's receipt of Union's notice of desire to arbitrate, select an arbitrator, either by mutual agreement or by jointly requesting the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to submit a list
of five (5) arbitrators. Within five (5) working days after the receipt
of such list, Company and Union shall eliminate four (4) names therefrom by alternately striking one. The person whose name remains on the
list shall serve as the sole arbitrator for such grievance. Unless the parties
mutually agree otherwise, only one grievance shall be heard by an arbitrator, and grievances shall be submitted to arbitration in the order in which
they are appealed to arbitration. The arbitrator, when so selected, shall proceed as soon as practicable to hold a hearing. Each party shall pay its own
expenses of arbitration, and the expenses and fee of the arbitrator shall be
divided equally between Company and Union.
SECTION 4. The sole function and jurisdiction of the arbitrator shall be
to determine whether Company or Union is correct with reference to the
application or interpretation of the identified contract provision in the
respect alleged in the written grievance and/or notice of desire to arbitrate. The arbitrator shall have no power to change, amend, modify, supplement, fill in, or otherwise alter in any respect whatsoever this agreement
or any part thereof, and the express terms of this agreement shall be the
sole source of rights and/or obligations adjudicated or declared by the
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arbitrator. The decision of the arbitrator, within the limits prescribed by
this Article, shall be final and binding on all parties. Any case referred to
the arbitrator on which he has no power to rule shall be referred back to
the parties without a decision.

